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COMMENTS
WISCONSIN PROFESSIONAL SERVICE CORPORATIONS
UNDER THE NEW "KINTNER" REGULATIONS
Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 the term "corporation"
encompasses associations, joint stock and insurance companies., While
this definition first appeared in its present form in the Revenue Act
of 1917,2 nothing relevant to the term appears in the congressional dis-
cussions prior to the passage of the 1917 Act. However, when it was
proposed for reenactment, in 1919, Mr. Garner was questioned on the
floor on the House of Representatives as to the meaning of the term
"association." He told his colleagues to look the definition up in the
dictionary and further stated: "I think it means a number of people,
whether organized under law or voluntarily."3 This loose definition
has been refined over the years as subsequent discussions will show.
Generally speaking, it has now come to mean "an organization
whose characteristics require it to be classified as a corporation rather
than as another organization. . .. -4 The leading case of United States
v. Kintner5 was the first major case in which a professional service
organization was held to be an association and therefore taxed as a
corporation. The Ninth Circuit held that an association of doctors had
sufficient corporate characteristics, as set out by the Supreme Court in
Commissioner v. Morrissey,6 for it to be taxed as a corporation (asso-
ciation). Most of the controversy that exists in this area today stems
from the Kintner case.
At first the Commissioner refused to accept Kintner.7 This position
was modified in 1957 with the announcement that new regulations
would be issued.8 These regulations were proposed in December, 1959,
and the final regulations were adopted on November 15, 1960.9 These
were numbered 301.7701-1 and 3-7701-2, and "Kintner" regulations.
Subsequent to their adoption it was hoped that Congress would amend
the Code to either allow professional service organizations to be treated
as "associations" for tax purposes10 or allow them certain deductions
I INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954, §7701.
2 Revenue Act of 1917, 40 Stat. 300 (1917).
356 CONG. REc. 10418 (1919).
4 Treas. Reg. §301.7701-2(a) (1) (1960).
5 United States v. Kintner, 216 F. 2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
6 Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
7 Rev. Rul. 57-546, 1957-2 Cum. BULL. 409.
S Proposed Treas. Reg. §§301.7701-1 to 301.7701-11, 24 Fed. Reg. 10450 (1959).
9 T. D. 6503, 1962-2 CuM. BULL. 409.
10 1963 and 1964: S. 2403 (Talmadge); H.R. 9217 (Weltner); H.R. 9690
(Davis); H.R. 9874 (McClory); H.R. 10070 (Rogers); H.R. 10418 (Hal-
pern); H.R. 11079 (Brotzman): H.R. 11084 (Dent): H.R. 11548 (Nelsen).
1965: S. 177 (Talmadge) ; H.R. 697 (Weltner) ; H.R. 1688 (Davis) ; H.R. 4969
(Nelsen) ; H.R. 7974 (Quie) ; H.R. 8296 (Stephens) ; H.R. 8374 (Landrum);
H.R. 8617 (Clark).
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comparable to those granted corporations and their employees., When
these efforts failed, attention was directed to state legislatures and
statutes were adopted which allowed professional service organizations
to form corporations which might fit the definition of corporation (or
association) under section 7701 (a) (3).12
In May, 1963, the Service announced that it had received numerous
requests for rulings as to the tax status of professional service organi-
zations formed under the state statutes. It refused these requests pend-
ing the issuance of new regulations.'13 The Service issued proposed
regulations in December of 1963'1 and held hearings from March 4
through March 6 of 1964. On February 2, 1965, in Treasury Decision
6797,1' the final regulation was adopted in somewhat less stringent
form but still retaining the basic restrictions of the proposed regulation.
The purposes of this comment are: (1) to compare the "Kintner"
regulations with the new amendments finalized in Treasury Decision
6797; (2) to discuss whether the professional service corporations or-
ganized under the Wisconsin statute4 will meet the tests of the regu-
lations as amended; and (3) to attempt to discern if the regulations,
when subjected to litgation, will be considered as valid interpretation
of 7701 (a) (3).
I. TEE KINTNER REGULATIONS AND T. D. 6797
In order to place Treasury Decision 6797 in perspective, it is neces-
sary to discuss first the regulations as they existed from 1960-1965."
Section 301.7701-111 deals with "Classification of organizations for
tax purposes." Paragraph (a) defines "person" as including a number
of organizations and paragraph (b) explains that there are certain
classes or categories into which these various orguaizations fall for
tax purposes. These categories include associations (which are taxed
as corporations), partnerships and trusts. The tests or standards which
are used in classifying an organization under the Code are interpreted
in sections 301.7701-2 through 301.7701-4 of the regulations.' "
Paragraph (c) of section 301.7701-1 incorporates the first change
of T. D. 6797. Paragraph (c) deals with the "effect of local law." The
pre-1965 part of this paragraph reiterated that for purposes of taxa-
tion, the classes into which an organization is placed are determined
under the Code; and, regardless of state law classification, these organi-
zations will be classified uniformly depending upon their nature. While
11 Ibid.
12 INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954, §7701.
13 Tax Barometer, December 2, 1961, p. 1.
14 Proposed Treas. Reg. §§301.7701-1 (d), 7701-2(h), 29 Fed. Reg. 13750 (1963).
15 T.D. 6797, 1965 INT. REv. BULL., No. 9, at 38.
16 Wis. LAws 1961, ch. 350 (WIs. STAT. §180.99).
17 Supra note 9.
18 Treas. Reg. §301.7701-1 (1960).
'9 Treas. Reg. §§301.7701-2, 7701-4 (1960).
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the Code establishes the tests or standards to determine the classifica-
tion, local law determines the legal relationships and interests to which
the tests of the Code are applied. To this, T. D. 6797 adds a comment
to the effect that the labels applied by local law to organizations are in
themselves of no importance in the classification under the Code, and
give us the example of a professional service organization which was
formed under a state law labeling it a professional service "corpora-
tion," which would not be taxed as a corporation merely because of its
label. The effect of this addition is not clear. The pre-1965 regulations
said that if an organization was classified as a trust by one state and as
a corporation in another it would be classified uniformly under the
Code.20 The words "classification" and "label" for these purposes
would seem to be almost identical, which would mean that the T. D.
6797 change is of little meaning. But the T. D. 6797 change seems to
say that regardless of the uniformity of labeling by the states, the
Service will look to the legal relationships and interests established
under state law and apply the tests and standards of the regulations
uniformly to these legal relationships and interests.
Paragraph (c),21 as a whole, attempts to reflect the Supreme Court's
pronouncements in the relationship of local law and federal tax law.
In Morgan v. Commissioner the Court said:
State law creates interests and rights. The federal revenue acts
designate what interests and rights, so created, shall be taxed.
Our duty is to ascertain the meaning of the words used to speci-
fy the thing taxed. If it is found in a given case that an interest
or right created by local law was the object intended to be taxed,
the federal law must prevail no matter what name is given to the
interest by state law.2
The Commissioner's position appears to be that state law creation
of interests and rights is limited to: (1) the legal relationship of the
member of the organization among themselves; (2) the legal relation-
ship of the members to third parties; and, (3) the interests of mem-
bers of an organization in the assets of that organization. The federal
tax law, according to the Comissioner,23 presumably determines
whether these legal relationships and interests established by state law
are sufficient to classify the organization as an association and, there-
fore, taxable as a corporation.
Unfortunately, the legislative history of section 7701(a)(3)24 and
its predecessors is not helpful. However, in the Morrissey case 5 the
20Supra note 9.
21 Supra note 18.
22 Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78 (1939).
23 Treas. Reg. §301.7701-1(c) (1960).
24 INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954, §7701.
25 Supra note 6.
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Supreme Court listed what it considered to be the salient characteri-
stics of a corporation in finding a Massachusetts business trust to be
an association. These characteristics are: (1) Associates, (2) an ob-
jective to carry on a business for profit and divide the gains therefrom,
(3) limited liability, (4) continuity of life, (5) centralization of man-
agement, and (6) free transferability of interests. According to this
case, an organization merely has to resemble, but not be identical to,
a corporation to be classified an association in the application of these
characteristics. The Commissioner's interpretation of the Morrissey case
and his application of those characteristics of a corporation will de-
termine if an organization is to be taxed as a corporation because it is
an association within the meaning of section 301.7701-226 of the regu-
lations.
Section 301.7701-2 deals specifically with associations and sets out
the tests or standards which must be met for an organization to be
taxed as a corporation. T. D. 6797 changed the title of the section
from "Associations" to "Associations, including organizations not pre-
viously considered to be corporations, although labeled corporations, to
the tests of this section." Presumably, these rules do not apply to all
corporations.
Subsection (a)27 sets forth the characteristics of a corporation and
how they are to be construed. The remaining subsections explain the
tests that are to be used in determining if the characteristics in (a) are
present. If the characteristics are present the organization will be
taxed as a corporation.
These characteristics are identical to those set down in the Mor-
rissey case, supra.2 8 If upon the facts in each case the characteristics
of the organization more nearly resemble a corporation than a partner-
ship or a trust it will be taxed as an association.
An organization will not be classified as an association unless the
organization has more corporate characteristics than noncorporate
characteristics. In determining if there are more corporate characteris-
tics, those that are common to the corporation and the organization
being classified are not to be used. So that, because (1) Associates and
(2) carrying on a business for profit, are common to corporations and
to partnerships or professional service organizations, these character-
istics will not be considered 2 9 Therefore the organization must have
more of the remaining four characteristics than not to be classified as
an association.
26 Treas. Reg. §301.7701-2 (1960).
271 bid.
2s Ibid.
29 In the case of a one man operation the characteristic of associates would not
be common to it and a corporation. Therefore, the characteristic associates
could be used to determine if a one man PSC is to be taxed as a corporation.
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The remaining part of subsection (a) explains the years to which
301.7701-2 is applicable. The regulations for our purposes are applic-
able to tax years beginning after December 31, 1960. However, where
a partnership, association or a professional service organization was
formed under a local law or regulatory rule authorizing the formation
of such an organization, paragraph (h),30 which will be described later
in this comment, will not apply to an taxable years ending on or before
December 31, 1964, if the organization made its return for any such
year and filed it on time as if its income were subject to the corporate
income tax.31
Subsections (b) through (e) of 301.7701-232 deal with each of the
four characteristics that will be used in determining whether the or-
ganization will be taxed as a corporation (association.).
Under subsection (b) 3 3 an organization has continuity of life if the
death, insanity, bankruptcy, retirement, resignation or expulsion of any
member will not cause a dissolution. Dissolution is defined as an altera-
tion of the identity of an organization by reason of a change in the re-
lationship between its members as determined under local law.An agree-
ment among the members that the business will continue upon the
happening of one of the above stated events will bring about continuity
of life only if permitted by local law. If any member, either by local
law or agreement, has the power to dissolve the organization, continuity
of life will not exist.
Centralization of management exists in subsection (c) 34 if any per-
son or group of persons, not including all the members, has continuing
exclusive authority to make all management decisions The managers
must be able to make independent business decisions on behalf of the
organization without the ratification of the members of the organiza-
tion. This authority may not be merely to perform ministerial tasks.
The managers do not have to be members of the organization and their
authority is to resemble the powers and functions of a statutory Board
of Directors.
Limited liability is said to be present under subsection (d) 35 if
under local law a cerditor may seek personal satisfaction from a mem-
ber of the organization where the assets of the organization are not
sufficient to satisfy the claims of the creditor against the organization.
Even if the member makes an agreement with another whereby he
transfers his liability to the other person, if under local law, the mem-
ber is still liable, limited liability does not exist.
30 Treas. Reg. §301.7701-2(h) (1965).
31 Treas. Reg. §301.7701-2(a) (5) (1965).
32 Treas. Reg. §§301.7701-2(b)-(e) (1960).
33 Treas. Reg. §301.7701-2(b) (1960).
34 Treas. Reg. §301.7701-2(c) (1960).
3 Treas. Reg. §301.7701-2(d) (1960).
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If under (b), (c) or (d) the organization is formed under the
Uniform Partnership Act or the Uniform Limited Partnership Act
none of the characteristics explained in those sections are said to exist
with the exception of the provision in (d) (2) for a general partner
of a limited partnership in situations where he is not liable beyond his
interest in the organization and where he is a "dummy" acting as an
agent of the limited partnership.
Under (e) (i)3c an organization has free transferability of interests
if a member, without the consent of the other members, has the power
to substitute for himself a person who is not a member of the organi-
zation, with all of the attributes of interest of the transferor. In other
words, if the transferor has the right to share in the p-ofits and partici-
pate in management but can only transfer his right to share in the
profits without the consent of the other members free transferability
does not exist.
Subsection (e) (ii)3 7 qualifies (e) (i) to the extent that where a
member can freely transfer his interest only after having offered it to
the present members, a modified form of free transferability exists.
Here, apparently, if there was a further requirement of consent, free
transferability would not exist. The modified form will be accorded
less significance than if the characteristic was present in an unmodified
form.
The major change of T. D. 6797 is the addition of subsection (h)
titled "Classification of professional service organizations."'38 Each one
of (h)'s five sections refers in order to (a) through (e) of 301.7701-2
which were previously discussed. The remaining part of this section of
the comment will deal with the further tests that (h) applies to pro-
fessional service organizations to determine if they are to be classified
as associations and the reasons why T. D. 6797 had to delete example
(1) in paragraph (g).39
Subparagraph (1) of (h) 40 sets out the definition of a professional
service organization in a negative fashion. If an organization satisfies
this definition it will have to meet the further tests of (h) along with
the tests of (a) through (e). A professional service organization is an
organization formed by one or more persons to engage in the business
of rendering professional services for profit which may not be or-
ganized as an ordinary business corporation with the usual characteris-
tics of such corporation. There are two tests implied in this definition,
the first being that it must be organized as an ordinary business corpo-
ration and secondly, that it must have the usual characteristics of such
36 Treas. Reg. §301.7701(e) (i) (1960).37Treas. Reg. §301.7701-2(e) (ii) (1960).
38 Supra note 30.
39 Treas. Reg. §301.7701- 2 (g) (1) (1960).
40 Treas. Reg. §301.7701-2(h) (1) (1965).
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corporation while engaging in the business of rendering professional
services for profit to escape the purview of (h).
If such an organization is not formed under local law as an ordi-
nary business corporation it will come within the purview. However,
even if under local law it is organized as an ordinary business corpora-
tion, if for some other reason it is deprived of the usual characteristics
of such a corporation, it will nevertheless be subject to the further tests
of (h). The additional factors that will be taken into account in deter-
mining if an organization has the required characteristics are local law,
the local regulatory rules, the special requirements of the profession,
its charter, articles of association, by-laws and all other facts, docu-
ments or rules relating to the formation of the organization and govern
or pertain to the relationships which this organization establishes.
A rather interesting question can arise at this point; does the word
"characteristic" as used in (h) (1) in speaking of characteristics of or-
dinary business corporations refer to the same type of "characteristic"
referred to in (a). 41 If it does, it seems that if an organization is en-
gaged in the business of rendering professional services for profit then
the tests of (h) (2) through (h) (5) should be applied to all such
organizations and that this will be the only way that one will be able
to determine if the organization satisfies the definition of (h) (1). If
the word refers to different types of characteristics, then the tests of
(h) (1) would have to be applied first in order to determine if the (h)
(2) through (h) (5) tests are even relevant. It would seem more rea-
sonable to believe that the former of these is the correct interpretation.
No doubt characteristics other than those set out in (a) could be
found. However, because these are the major characteristics of cor-
porations, most other characteristics would be classified under one of
these or would be too insignificant to be determinative.
The characteristics of a corporation, as explained earlier in this
comment, were identified in (a) and explained in (b) through (e) .42 If
an organization is engaged in the business of rendering professional
services for profit, then the further tests of (h) (2) through (h) (5),43
using all of the factors mentioned in (h) (1), will determine if the
organization should be classified as an association for tax purposes. It
is very difficult to see how any organization engaged in rendering pro-
fessional services for profit can escape the restrictiveness of (h). Re-
gardless of how they are organized, all are governed by special pro-
fessional regulations and local regulatory rules in such a way that they
must, at least in some ways, be distinguished for ordinary business cor-
porations. This alone is sufficient to bring them under (h).
41 Treas. Reg. §301.7701-2 (a) (1) (1960).
42 Treas. Reg. §301.7701-2 (1960).
43Treas. Reg. §301.7701-2 (1960).
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Subparagraph (h) (2) 41 generally provides that if death, insanity,
bankruptcy, retirement, resignation, expulsion, professional disqualifi-
cation, or election to an inconsistent public office will, under local law,
cause a dissolution of the organization, the organization does not have
continuity of life as explained in (b) .45 Continuity of life is described
by example, stating that a business corporation has a "continuing iden-
tity as an entity"46 which does not depend on the stockholders being
employed by the organization or by an employment relationship tied to
his right to share in the profits. A professional service organizations'
requirements of the profession, it is said, require that that an ability to
share in the profits of the organization must be coupled with an em-
ployment relationship and that in the event that the employment rela-
tionship is terminated the interest must be disposed of in some way.
Thus, the continuing existence of the organization is dependent upon
an agreement among the members remaining to employ the proposed
successor. This type of continuity is said to be similar to that under the
Uniform Partnership Act and is therefore insufficient to satisfy this
characteristic.
It may be worthwhile to note here that the American Bar Associa-
tion Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances has stated an
opinion in this regard. This opinion says:
The fact that the form of organization used to practice law
continues as an entity, uninterrupted by death, incompetency,
bankruptcy, etc., of its members does not in and of itself present
any ethical problems. Continuity of life necessarily involves
transferability of interests. Thus continuity of life must be at-
tained by such restrictions on transferability of interests as may
be essential to avoid ethical objections. If continuity of life may
involve continuity of name, it must be kept in mind that Canon
33 places certain restraints on the selection and use of a firm
name. Furthermore, the previously discussed views of this Com-




Regardless of a state statute (Wisconsin Statute 180.99), Canon 334s
of the Canons of Professional Ethics may defeat a taxpayer-lawyer's
claim to come under this section. This Canon would seem to dictate
what the ethical considerations are and this may be determinative under
(h) (2). Canon 33 states generally that no name should be given to a
professional legal partnership that may mislead the public, however, it
goes on to say that a deceased member's name may be used if permitted
44 Treas. Reg. §301.7701-2(h) (2) (1965).
45 Treas. Reg. §301.7701-2(b) (1960).46 Treas. Reg. §301.7701-2 (b) (1960).
4 Opinions of the Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Supple-
ment to the 1957 Volume, Opinion No. 303, p. 23 (1961).48American Bar Association, Canons of Professional Ethics, Canon 33.
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by local custom. Local custom in Wisconsin says that a deceased mem-
ber's name may be used for four years.49 Canon 33 goes on to state
"When a member of a firm, on becoming a judge (election to an in-
consistent public office), is precluded from practicing law, his name
should not be continued in the firm name."50 This would seem to limit
the ability of the Wisconsin lawyer to establish continuity of life. If
continuity of life is not continuity of name, the way should be clear.
Subparagraph (h) (3)51 deals with centralization of management
which is said to be present where the managers of the professional
service organization are vested with continuing exclusive authority to
determine nine specific matters in the exercise of their authority. They
must have the power to make all nine of these decisions. If these matters
are interpreted broadly it appears that there will be few decisions left
for the nonmanagement members to make. Apparently the Service in-
tended this to be interpreted broadly because the regulation further
provides that where the members retain the traditional professional
responsibility, which means that each member makes his own profes-
sional decisions and he is personally responsible to the party he is
making the decision for, centralization of management does not exist
because this is essentially different from that present in an ordinary
business corporation.
Some writers have pointed out that a law corporation, to take one
possible example of a professional service organization, exists pri-
marily for the practice of law and that, since a centralized management
group would not seem to be controlling this in any significant degree,
it would be making those business decisions which are not really at
the core of the organization's activity, rather those which are on the
periphery or are merely housekeeping chores.- Others argue that much
of the business of the large law firm is carried on by the small manage-
ment group and that this is sufficient to satisfy this characteristic. 3
Limited liability of professional service organizations is covered
in (h) (4) .5 Liability is limited if the personal liability of the members
of the organization is no greater in any aspect than the liability of the
shareholder-employees of an ordinary business corporation. A flat state-
ment is then made that if a mutual agency relationship similar to that
existing in an ordinary professional partnership must exist under local
law or rules pertaining to professional practice, then limited liability is
not present. The mutual agency relationship would seem to refer to a
4938 Wis. BAR. BULL. 24 (1965).
50 Supra note 48.51 Treas. Reg. §301.7701-2(h) (3) (1965.
52 Deering, Incorporation by Attorneys, 42 ORE. L. REv. 93, 101 (1963).
53Oh], Corporate Practice of Law in New York, 40 TAXEs 263, 285 (1962).
5s Treas. Reg. §301.7701-2(h) (4) (1965).
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legal relationship; presumably a mere moral relationship would not
suffice.
The Committee of Professional Ethics and Grievances of the
American Bar Association, in its 1961 opinion on this subject, states:
All lawyers within an organization bear a professional responsi-
bility for the legal service of the organization whether they are
under personal liability or not. This general professional re-
sponsibility though legal liability is limited prevents any violation
of Canon 34, when the lawyers in the organization are en-
titled to share oi the fees collected without regard to whether
they personally participated in the rendition of services.55
This opinion goes on to state that the committee feels that its
opinion makes it clear that it is possible for lawyers to participate in
professional service organizations with a limited legal liability but says
that a professional moral responsibility must still be present.
In view of this, it appears that, with regard to lawyers, it is not
necessary that a mutual agency relationship exist but that such a rela-
tionship is merely the custom arising because the majority of law firms
have been organized as partnerships over the years.
Subparagraph (h) (5)56 deals with the characteristic of free trans-
ferability of interests. Subparagraph (h) (5) (i) 5 7 states that where
the right of a member of a professional service organization to share
in the profits of the organization is dependent upon an employment
relationship, then free transferability will only exist if the member is
able to transfer his right to share in the profits along with the right to
an employment relationship without the consent of the other mem-
bers.
Subparagraph (h) (5) (ii) 5s states that no modified form of free
transferability exists where the members may transfer their interest
freely but only after having offered this interest to the present mem-
bers. This, the regulation states, would give the other individuals in the
firm the power to determine who the firm will employ and that this is
such a substantial hinderance on free transferability that the presence
of this power precludes the existence of the modified form mentioned
in (e) (2).59
The last change made by T.D. 6797, which would illustrate the
effect of (h), is the elimination of example (1) under (g) 60 which was
referred to earlier in this comment. In this example, no limited liability
existed and this would remain the same under (h) because of the flat
55 Supra note 47 at p. 20.56 Treas. Reg. §301.7701-2(h) (5) (1965).5 Treas. Reg. §301.7701-2(h) (5) (i) (1965).
58 Treas. Reg. §301.7701-2(h) (5) (ii) (1965).59 Treas. Reg. §301.7701-2(e) (2) (1960).
60 Treas. Reg. §301.7701- 2 (g) (1) (1960).
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statement given in the fact situation. It appears that under the new
regulation that centralization of management would continue to exist, as
the service conceded it did under the old example. Here the seven mem-
bers of a medical clinic vested the management in four of its members
elected by all of the members and under local law the executive com-
mittee's actions bound all of them and no one could act without its
approval. The characteristics of continuity of life cannot be determined
because the only reference made to this characteristic is that there is an
agreement among the members stating that the organization is not to be
dissolved when one of the members leaves the organization. The re-
quirements of (h) (2) state that this characteristic must be determined
without regard to any agreement among the members and that local
law, applicable regulations and professional ethics will be determinative.
Free transferability of interests also does exist because in the agreement
among the members there is a "right of first refusal" which is not
permitted under (h) (5) (ii). Thus, although its organization has cen-
tralization of management, it does not have any of the other determining
characteristics.
II. WISCONSIN STATUTES 180.99 AND THE TREASURY REGULATIONS
In the 1961 session of the Wisconsin legislature, the "Service Cor-
poration Law" for Wisconsin was enacted.6' The statute is substantially
identical to those passed in seventeen other states allowing incorpora-
tion.62 The passage of such a statute had been urged by the members
of the professions because of their feeling that they were being dis-
criminated against by the Internal Revenue Code,6 3 in that corporations
and their employees were allowed certain deductions under the Code
which they weren't entitled to as members of a partnership or sole
proprietorship. In an effort to remedy this situation the professions
sought assistance from the state legislature in the form of a statute
that would allow them to incorporate.
Part II of this comment will attempt to analyze this statute to
determine if it would permit a service corporation to meet the tests of
the regulations with their T.D. 6797 amendments so that it may be
taxed as a corporation under the Code.6 4 Because of the technicality of
61 Wis. LAWS 1961, Ch. 350 (WIs. STAT. 180.99).
62 ARiE. GEN. CORP. AcT, §64-2001 (1963); FLA. STAT. §§621.01 to 621.14 (1961);
GA. CODE, §§84-4301 to 84-4318 (1961) (This statute permits formation of an
association, however, the provisions are similar to those allowing corpora-
tions); Ky. GEN. CORP. LAW, §§274.005 to 274.125 (1962); MIcH. GEN. CORP.
Acr, §§450.221 to 450.235 (1962); MINN. STAT., §§326.14 (1945); MO. PROF.
CORP. AcT (1963); REv. CODE OF MONT., §§15-103, 15-104, 15-2101 to 15-2117
(1963); REV. STAT. OF NEB., §§1-153, 1-159 (1953); NEV. GEN. CORP. LAW,
Ch. 385, Laws of 1962; N.J. GEN. CORP. LAW, §§14:19-1 to 14:19-17 (1963);
N.D. PROF. CORP. AcT, (1963) ; OHIO REV. CODE, §§1785.01 to 1785.08 (1961) ;
OKLA. PROF. CORP. AcT, (1963); UTAH, PROF. CORP. AcT,, (1963); VT. PROF.
CORP. AcT (1963); One court, Colorado, allowed incorporation by supreme
court rule, effective December 5, 1961.6 3 
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954.
64 T.D. 6797, 1965 INT. REV. BULL. No. 9, at 38.
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this subject and in the hope of facilitating an easier understanding, the
order of this part of the comment will conform to the order of the
subsections of the regulations dealing with professional service organ-
izations analyzed in Part I rather than the precise order of the sub-
sections of 180.99.
Section 301.7701-1(c) of the regulations discusses the effect of
local laws as outlined previously and makes particular reference to
labels applied to organziations saying that of themselves they are of no
importance.65 Subsection 180.99(1) states that the title of the statute
is "The Service Corporation Law." 66 This, therefore, would appear to
give little weight to the taxpayer's argument. What the service looks to
in the State laws is the legal relationships and interests established
by the states.
The remaining section of the regulations, as they now exist, that are
relevant in determining the status of the Service Corporation for income
tax purposes are the subparagraphs under paragraph (h) of 301.7701-2
which were added by T.D. 6797.
Subparagraph (h) (1)67 states that, if an organization is found to
be a professional service organization, it will have to satisfy the further
tests of (h) along with the tests of (a) through (e) in 301.7701-2, and
defines a professional service organization as an organization of one or
more persons formed to engage in the business of rendering professional
service for profit which may not be organized as an ordinary business
corporation with the usual characteristics of such corporation. As was
stated in Part I of this text, it is unclear what the actual meaning of
this phrase is and an attempt will be made to define it later. However,
this section of the text will try to show certain characteristics which
indicate that the service corporation organized under section 180.99 of
the Wisconsin Statutes has or does not have such characteristics.
Subsection (2) of 180.9968 outlines how a service corporation is to
be formed. This subsection provides that any "one or more natural
persons licensed, certified or registered pursuant to any provisions of
the statutes provided all have the same license, certificate or registration
may organize and own stock in a service corporation under this
section." 69 (Emphasis added) This section goes on to state that a "cor-
poration" may operate an establishment whereby services are rendered
to its clients but that the services may only be rendered by officers,
agents, or employees who are licensed in the field of endeavor stated
in the articles of incorporation.
The fact that a separate statute had to be enacted in Chapter 180
T7
65 Treas. Reg. §301.7701-1(c) (1960).
66 Wis. LAws 1961, ch. 350.67 Treas. Reg. §301.7701-2(h) (1) (1965).
68 Wis. STAT. §180.99(1) (1963).
69 WIs. STAT. §180.99(1) (1963).70 Wis. STAT. Ch. 180.
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of the Wisconsin Statutes to allow a professional service organization
to incorporate creates an inference that a corporation formed under
section 180.99 is not an ordinary business corporation. Furthermore,
the above licensing restriction, placed on the organizing, incorporating
and owning stock in other corporations has no counterpart in the rest
of Chapter 180. Section 180.44 merely requires that one or more natural
persons over the age of twenty-one act as incorporators of other corpo-
rations formed under Chapter 180 and contains no subsection on stock
ownership. 71
Subsection (3) of 180.9971 states that a PSC organized under this
statute is subject to the other sections of Chapter 180 unless 180.99
specifically deals with the matter and then 180.99 would apply. It
further states that a PSC may not engage in a business activity other
than that for which it was chartered. Under subsection (2) a PSC may
only be chartered to render professional services. Because of this state-
ment in subsection (2), 180.0373 would not apply. Section 180.03 states
that a corporation may be organized under Chapter 180 for any lawful
business or purpose with certain restrictions which we are not concerned
with. This would seem to set the standard for the ordinary business
corporation and because of 180.99(2)'s specific statement that a PSC
cannot engage in ordinary business activity this would certainly seem
to deny the PSC the status of an ordinary business corporation.
Because of the emphasis placed on the term "ordinary business
corporation" it might be wise to digress for a moment in an attempt to
define that term. We have seen by 301.7701-1 (c) 74 that the label given
to the organization is of no importance in itself so that this would not
be a controlling factor. The term "ordinary business corporation" is
not readily definable the way it is used in this regulation. It would ap-
pear by implication, as pointed out earlier, that the definition would
encompass the six Morrissey7 5 characteristics plus, it seems, any other
characteristics, such as being able to carry on any other lawful business
activity and subject to no restrictions on incorporators that the Service
may find useful in distinguishing a PSC from any other corporation
organized under Chapter 180. In mere common parlance the term "or-
dinary business corporation" would not seem to embrace the profes-
sional service corporation. It appears, however, that the characteristics
pointed out in the Morrissey case are not all of the characteristics of
an ordinary business corporation, nor should they be solely control-
ling.
Subsection (4) of 180.9976 allows the PSC to bear the name of
71 WIs. STAT. §180.44 (1963).
72 WIs. STAT. §180.99(3) (1963).
73 WIS. STAT. §180.03 (1963).
74 Treas. Reg. §301.7701-1 (c) (1960).
75 Supra note 6.
76 Wis. STAT. §180.99(4) (1963).
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anyone provided that if the name of a person who is not or was not a
shareholder is used the PSC must record that name and the names of
the shareholders in the office of the register of deeds where it is located.
This, of itself, would seem to be akin to that which is required of other
corporations organized under Chapter 180. However, ethical considera-
tions of the professions would come into play here. The Canons of
Professional Ethics, at least for lawyers,77 would not allow a PSC
of lawyers to include the name of a person who has never been asso-
ciated with the firm to be used in its name. Under 301.7701-2(h) (1)
the special regulations of the profession will be taken into account in
determining its characteristics.
By 180.0778 a corporation formed under Chapter 180, excluding
180.99, must contain the word "corporation," "incorporated," or
"limited" or an abbreviation of one of these terms. Subsection (4) of
180.99 states that the word "chartered" or "limited" or their abbrevia-
tions or the word "Professional Service Corporation" or "S.C." must
be used.79 This is another difference, significant or not. The Service
has stated that labels would not be determinative that an organization
was a corporation but no doubt it would use this as another prong in
its argument that it was not an "ordinary business corporation."
By subsection (5)80 a PSC is required to file and record its Articles.
This requirement is identical to the requirements of 180.46 and 180.48.11
Subsection (11) of 180.9982 requires the PSC to file an annual
report with the Secretary of State by March 31 of each year showing
(1) names and post office addresses of its shareholders, directors and
officers, and (2) a certification that these persons are duly licensed,
certified or otherwise authorized to render the professional services in-
volved. This report must be signed by the president or vice-president
and the secretary or assistant secretary and acknowledged before a
notary public. The report need contain no fiscal information and is
filed in lieu of the regular annual report required by Chapter 180.
The annual report of other corporations is described in 180.7913
and required to be filed by 180.793(1).84 Therefore, all corporations
under Chapter 180 are required to file an annual report to the Secre-
tary of State and the only difference between a PSC and the other
corporations is a slight difference in form. This would not appear to
be of enough significance for the Service to emphasize it.
After it is determined (1) whether the organization was found to
7 American Bar Association, Canons of Professional Ethics, Canon 33.
78 Wis. STAT. §180.07 (1963).
79 Wis. STAT. §180.99(4) (1963).
80 Wis. STAT. §180.99(5) (1963).
81 Wis. STAT. §§180.46, 180.48 (1963).
S2 WIS. STAT. §180.99(11) (1963).
83 Wis. STAT. §180.791 (1963).
s- Wis. STAT. §180.793(1) (1963).
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engage in the rendering of professional services for profit and (2) that
it may not be organized as an "ordinary business corporation" for which
it is hoped the foregoing analysis will be helpful, 301.7701-2(h) (1)
says that this organization, because it is a professional service organiza-
tion as the regulations define it, must satisfy the further tests of (h)
along with the tests of (a) through (e) to determine if the organization
has more corporate characteristics than noncorporate characteristics.
Subparagraph (h) (2) of 301.7701-2 establishes the continuity of
life characteristic. It states that where professional disqualification or
election to an inconsistent public office would result in the dissolution of
the organization, the organization does not have continuity of life. Sub-
section 180.99(6)5 states that any person not licensed, certified, or
registered by a state agency may not be a stockholder, director, or officer
of a PSC and specifically may not have any part in the control or
ownership of the PSC. Further, if a person was licensed and is legally
disqualified or is elected to an inconsistent public office, this person
must sever his connection with the PSC, and must not vote shares by
proxy. A corporation's failure to comply with this will be grounds for
suspension or forfeiture of its franchise.
It would appear that the only time that a PSC would be dissovled
for any of the previously mentioned reasons would be in the case where
the sole owner of a one man corporation is professionally disqualified to
own shares in a PSC. In this case, because of the requirements of
180.99(6), obviously the corporation would either have to be dissolved
or continue to operate under the provisions of 180.99(10) (b) 86 whereby
it could continue to operate as a business corporation organized under
Chapter 180. In the latter case our problem would not arise. In the
case where there are two or more stockholders who operate as em-
ployees and one man becomes disqualified under 180.99. (10) (a) 8 7 the
corporation would still have perpetual existence. Dissolution is only
provided for if all members of the PSC are disqualified in some way
to act as members.
Subsection (h) (2) further states that a PSC must have "contin-
uing identity as an entity." Subsection 180.99(10) (a) states that a
corporation under this section shall have perpetual existence until dis-
solved in accordance with the other provisions of this Chapter. By this
statement it would appear that a PSC would have "continuing identity
as an entity" on a par with that of other corporations organized under
Chapter 180.
Subsection (10) (b) state that if all the members of the PSC should
for the same reason cease to be qualified to practice in their profession,
then the PSC shall operate as a business corporation organized under
65 Wis. STAT. §180.99(6) (1963).
66 WIS. STAT. §180.99(10) (b) (1963).
s7 WIS. STAT. §180.99(10) (a) (1963).
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Chapter 180 exclusive of 180.99. Here, by the mere fact that 180.99
exists, another difference arises. This, however, should not detract
from the PSC's ability to satisfy the characteristics of continuity of life.
With regard to this characteristic, one more slight problem should
be discussed. The provisions of 180.99(4) have previously been dis-
cussed and the only only problem that we might find with regard to
this characteristic would be that upon the disqualification of one of
the members his name may be restricted from use in the name of the
PSC by the requirements of the profession, and in the case of dis-
qualification that name may have to be deleted from the firm name. 8
Chapter 180 would only restrict the corporation from changing its
name if under 180.07, 180.08 or 180.81189 it attempted to change its
name to one of the "reserved name[s]" under 180.08. From this it
would seem that a corporation could freely change its name and still
retain its "continuity identity."90
The characteristic of centralization of management is described in
301.7701-2(h) (3).91 It states that the managers must have "continuing
exclusive authority" to determine nine specific matters mentioned in
Part I of this text.
The characteristic of centralization of management is not dealt with
in 180.99, but by the statement in 180.99(3) 92 that all other sections of
Chapter 180 apply where 180.99 does not specifically deal with the
problem; this may determine in itself that the characteristic of centrali-
zation of management is present. Section 180.3093 says that the business
affairs of a corporation are to be managed by a Board of Directors.
Section 180.4194 provides that appropriate officers are to be elected by
the Board of Directors and that they shall have such power as is given
to them by the Articles, by-laws or by resolution of the Board of Di-
rectors. There is no restriction in 180.99 as to the power which may be
given to the Board of Directors or the officers. From this, it seems that
there is no reason why a PSC could not have centralization of manage-
ment as any other corporation might have under Chapter 180.
There is nothing in this statute which would prohibit this deter-
mination. Subsection (h) (3) of 301.7701-2 goes on to state that where
the members retain "traditional professional responsibility" it is im-
possible for managers to determine these nine items. One of these items
is that the management must have authority to determine the profes-
sional policies and procedures to be used in each individual case. This
would seem to be the only sticky problem. In a law firm, for an example,
88 American Bar Association, Canons of Professional Ethics, Canon 33.
89 WIS. STAT. §§180.07, 180.08, 180.811 (1963).
90 Treas. Reg. §301.7701-2(h) (2) (1965).
91 Treas. Reg. §301.7701-2(h) (3) (1965).
92 WIs. STAT. §180.99(3) (1963).
93 WIS. STAT. §180.30 (1963).9 4 WIs. STAT. §180.41 (1963).
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if we can assume95 that when an attorney is acting while he is a mem-
ber of a firm that the entire firm is acting, then certainly the managers
of the firm, whether it be partnership or a PSC would have the
authority to determine the policies and procedures in each individual
case although it is not practical for them to do so. Analogous to this
situation would be the policies and procedures governing the conduct of
each individual salesman or each of the managers of the American
Telephone and Telegraph Company. Certainly the Board of Directors
or the officers would have the power to regulate these polices and pro-
cedures, but it would be hardly practical for them to do so. For these
reasons it would seem that in regard to this item and also the other
eight, the term "traditional professional responsibility" is rendered
meaningless by its use in this context and further that the PSC could
establish the characteristic of centralization of management.
The characteristic of limited liability is defined in (h) (4) of
301.7701-2." As explained in Part I, an organization has the character-
istic of limited liability if the members of the professional service or-
ganization have no greater liability than that of a stockholder-employee
of an ordinary business corporation. If, on the other hand, under local
law a mutual agency relationship exists with regard to the type of pro-
fessional practice, such organization lacks limited liability.
Subsection (8) of 180.9997 is titled "Contract and tort relationships
preserved." It states that 180.99 shall not alter any contract, tort or
other legal relationship between a person receiving professional services
and one or more persons who are licensed, certified or registered to
render such services and who are stockholders in the safe corporation;
and any legal liability which may arise out of such service shall be joint
and several among the stockholders of the same service corporation."9 8
This part seems to refer mainly to the legal liability for malpractice
and breach of contract for services. However, this subsection goes on
to state that a stockholder, director, etc., shall "not be personally liable
for the debts or contract obligations of the corporation."'9
Under 180.20(1)100 a stockholder is not liable to the corporation or
creditors for anything other than paying full consideration for the
shares of stock acquired. This would seem to free a stockholder from
any liability to the corporation provided that he has paid full considera-
tion for his shares. Therefore, as a stockholder, the stockholder of a
PSC under 180.99(8) would be subject to a greater area of liability
than a stockholder of other corporations organized under Chapter 180.
The liability of an employee of a PSC would also appear to be greater
957 C.J.S. Attorney and Client §150 (1937).96Treas. Reg. §301.7701-2(h) (4) (1965).
97 Ws. STAT. §180.99(8) (1931).
98 Wis. STAT. §180.99(8) (1963).
9 9 Wis. STAT. §180.99(8) (1963).
109 Wis. STAT. §180.20(1) (1963).
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than that of an employee of other corporations. It is stated in 180.99(8)
that in regard to contract debts the PSC employee's liability is limited
so that the only liability that could expand his area of liability as com-
pared to that of the employees of other corporations would be the lia-
bility arising out of tort, contract or other action arising from the
rendition of services by the members to their clients, patients, etc. which
180.99(8) declares not to be altered.
If this liability is not to be altered the question would then be what
is the liability presently, and is this liability any greater than that of an
agent of other corporations. It is very unclear what the legislature
meant by saying that the law in this area shall not be altered. It appears
that what is meant by this is that the rules of partnership law in regard
to their liability for the negligence or willful acts of their partners shall
apply. The Uniform Partnership Act'101 would hold one partner liable
for the acts of the other partners jointly and severally. Corpus Juris
Secundum states:
As the employment of a member of a law firm of attorneys
is that of the entire firm, an attorney is liable to a client for the
negligence, lack of skill, or wrongful acts of a partner, even
though he himself may have had no participation in, or knowl-
edge of the transaction. 0 2
This is also the rule with regard to medical clinics. 0 3 The reason, it
would seem, that the rules of partnership law would apply is that
traditionally lawyers, doctors, etc. have engaged in practice in the form
of a partnership.
If this is the case, the second step in this analysis is whether this
liability is greater than that for employees or agents of other corpora-
tions. Certainly joint and several liability would not be found for all
employees, agents or stockholders of other corporations, therefore a
member's liability in his employee status is greater in a PSC.
Subparagraph (h) (5)104 in defining the characteristics of free trans-
ferability of interests says that in order for this characteristic to be
present in an organization where the right to share in the profits is
dependent upon the existence of an employment relationship, the mem-
ber must be able to transfer the right to share in the profits and the
employment relationship. It further states that where the right of first
refusal exists free transferability will exist in a modified form.
Subsection (10) (c)' 05 provides that within 90 days of a members
disqualification for membership either the shares of the disqualified
member must be transferred to another who is eligible or the corporation
101 WIS. STAT. §123.10 (1963).
102 Supra note 95.
103 70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons, §54 (1937).
104 Treas. Reg. §301.7701-2(h) (5) (1965).
105 Wis. STAT. §180.99(10) (c) (1963).
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must redeem the shares at book value, and further spells out what is
meant by book value. It- says that nothing in this section shall limit the
right of the parties to make other arrangements to transfer shares pro-
vided that within 90 days all of the stock is transferred.
In this case, merely because all owners are required to be licensed
in the profession practiced, should the statute 0 6 be construed to re-
quire the existence of an employment relationship? Why could not the
members agree that although a member's interest could be transferred
to anyone (licensed), the right to employment could not be? By the
statute the right to share in the profits is not dependent on an employ-
ment relationship. This could clearly be handled in the Articles or
By-laws. Free transferability does not seem to be a salient characteristic
of a Corporation. 10 7 Aside from this fact, it would seem that the free
transferability requirement could be satisfied by the statute.
In conclusion, it appears that a Professional Service Corporation
organized under the Wisconsin statutes and found under 301.7701-1
(h) (1) to be a professional service organization will meet the tests of
(h) (2) through (h) (6)108 with regard to continuity of life, centrali-
zation of management and free transferability of interests. However,
it appears that it would not satisfy the test for limited liability.
III. TEE REGULATIONS AND SECTION 7701 (a) (3) OF THE CODE
In an effort to determine if 301.7701-1 through 301-7701-2109 are
valid interpretations of Section 7701 of the Code,110 we first must look
to find some authority for the Service to issue such regulations and
further, determine what force and effect these regulations are intended
to have.
Professor Davis in his administrative law treatise states that the
rules of administrative agencies can be divided into legislative and
interpretive rules."' He gives as the clearest case of a legislative rule
one issued under a statute which "has conferred power upon an agency
to issue the rule and the statute provides that the rule, if within the
granted power, shall have the force of law."' 1 2 An example of this
type of rule in the Code would be the provisions of Section 1502" 3
stating that in the filing of consolidated returns the Secretary or his
delegate may prescribe regulations so that the consolidated return would
reflect the accurate income tax liability of the several persons entitled
106 Wis. STAT. §180.99(6) (1963).
107 Closely held corporations generally have business continuation agreements and
buy-sell agreements or at least they should be advised to do so. This is a
limited restriction on free transferability yet close corporations are a large
percentage of the total corporations in the United States.
1
0 8 Treas. Reg. §§301.7701-2(h) (2)-(h) (6) (1965).
109 Treas. Reg. §§301.7701-1 to 301.7701-2 (1965).
110 INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954, §7701.
11 1 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise 298 (1958).
112 Supra note 111, p. 299.
113 INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954, §7805.
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to file the return. The extent of the court's power of review would be
limited to determining if the regulation is within the granted power,
issued pursuant to proper procedure and reasonable. 1 4
On the other hand, Professor Davis says that interpretive rules
can rest on statutory authorization or more commonly they impliedly
grow out of the work assigned by the legislative body to the agency"15
There is no specific grant of authority to the Service for the issuance
of regulations contained in Section 7701, so that the provisions of
Section 7805 generally giving to the Service authority to issue Rules
and Regulations would seem to apply. It says the Secretary or his
delegate "shall prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the en-
forcement of this title .... ,,1'6 The question would arise as to whether
this is a legislative or interpretive rule. On its face it is unclear as to
whether this authorizes the issuance of legislative or merely interpretive
regulations, but Davis states that "The great bulk of Treasury Regula-
tions clearly are interpretive rules, despite the provisions of 7805 .... 'IT
In support of his argument he cites dicta of the Supreme Court in
Skidmore v. Swift: "'This court has long given considerable and in
some cases decisive weight to Treasury decisions and to interpretive
regulations of the Treasury and other bodies that were not of adversary
origin.' ""s Davis, in another section of his treatise, goes on to show
Congressional intent for his analysis.": 9 If Professor Davis' conclusion
is correct, it would appear that in the case of an interpretive rule the
court in reviewing it would first look for Congressional intent. As was
pointed out in Part I of this text, there is no evidence of Congressional
intent available specifically referring to Section 7701 (a) (3). In such
a case the court could (1) give force of law to the rule, (2) disregard
the rule and substitute its own judgment, or (3) take a middle-of-the-
road course giving the rule some authoritative weight. In short, they
are able to substitute their judgment for that of the administrative body
and questions of desirability and wisdom. 20 There are several factors
that could determine which course the court may choose to follow, such
as the competence of the judges in the area, the length of time that the
rule has been in effect, and whether or not the statute has been re-
enacted with the regulation outstanding. The last of these would not be
relevant in our case because the Code was passed in 1954 and the
present regulations came out in 1960 and 1965. Similarly, it is doubtful
whether they have been in effect long enough to give them greater
weight. Davis states that it is impossible to pinpoint the factors which
"14 Supra note 111, p. 298.
115 Ibid.
116 INTERNAL REVENUE CODE: OF 1954, §7805.
17 Supra note 111, p. 300.11s Supra note 111, p. 301.
"19 Supra note 111, p. 310 and p. 311.
120 Supra note 111, p. 315.
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the courts give the most weight to in a tax case. He suggests that a
plurality of factors will no doubt control, not the least of which would
be the judge's agreement or disagreement with the regulation.121
It must be borne in mind that the lower courts will be bound by a
Supreme Court decision in the area and in review the Supreme Court
might well give great weight to its prior decision, particularly since it
antedated the adoption of the 1939 and 1954 Codes which made no
change in Section 7701. At the time of preparation of this text there
are no cases construng this regulation with its T.D. 6797 amendments. 122
Hence, it would appear that the only guidelines we might have that
would allow us to predict the interpretation to be given by the courts
would be those of the Supreme Court in the Morrissey case. 123 In an
attempt to use these guidelines in the case of a professional service or-
ganization it can be said that they, at best, are sketchy. As previously
mentioned, in the Morrissey case the Service sought to tax a so-called
Massachusetts Trust as an association (thereby taxed as a corpora-
tion) and the court found in favor of the Service. The Court in that
case did say some things that are of current importance. The Court
stated that "The inclusion of associations with corporations [in the
definition of 7701] implies resemblance; but it is resemblance and not
identity.""14 it further provides what the six salient corporate character-
istics are, as stated earlier, but gives little elaboraion. This would seem
to support the Service's interpretation as to what the general charac-
teristics are, but is not helpful as to whether or not the Service's attempt
to define these characteristics in more detail is reasonable or not.
Louis J. AwmRw, JR.
121 Supra note 111, p. 315.
122 Treas. Reg. §§301.7701-1, 7701-2 (1965).
223 Supra note 6.
124Supra note 6, p. 357.
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